Abstract. The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continuous change in nature. To model an everchanging environment, we develop a framework of evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions, where individuals' behaviors together with the games they play in one time step decide the games to be played next time step. Within this framework, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule: natural selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceeds k − k , which means b/c > k − k , where k is the average number of neighbors and k captures the effects from game transitions. We show that even if each individual game opposes cooperation, allowing for a transition between them can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. Even small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our work suggests that interdependence between the environment and the individuals' behaviors may explain the large-scale cooperation in realistic systems even when cooperation is expensive relative to its benefit.
Introduction
Cooperation is an integral part of biological systems and is of paramount importance to their prosperity. But cooperation, an altruistic act of bearing a cost to provide another individual with a benefit, reduces the survival advantage for the donor while fostering that of the recipient. Understanding how cooperation can be maintained in a competitive world has long been a focal issue in evolutionary biology and ecology [1] . The spatial distribution of a population makes an individual more likely to interact with neighbors than with those who are more distant, which affects evolutionary dynamics [2] . Past decades have seen an intensive investigation of the evolution of cooperation in structured populations [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . One of the bestknown findings is that weak selection favors cooperation if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic act, b, to the cost of expressing such an altruistic trait, c, exceeds the average number of neighbors, k, i.e. b/c > k [3, 6] . This simple rule strongly supports the proposition that population structures can promote cooperation, and it is widely accepted as one of the major mechanisms responsible for the evolution of cooperation [1] .
Despite these deep insights, empirical studies have produced evidence that many realistic systems are highly-connected, with each individual having many neighbors on average [9] . For example, in the actorcollaboration network, every actor has 61 collaborators on average, meaning k = 61 [9] . In such cases, the threshold for establishing cooperation, based on the rule b/c > k, is extremely high: the benefit from an altruistic act must be at least 61 times larger than its cost for cooperators to be favored over defectors. The rule, although providing valuable intuition about when cooperation can evolve in structured populations, is therefore often unattainable in practice [10] . The underlying mechanism for large-scale cooperation in these systems, especially when cooperation is sufficiently costly, is of practical significance but still largely remains an open question in the field. Here, we consider a natural way in which the cost-to-benefit threshold can be relaxed significantly.
In evolutionary game theory, the games played within a population affect individuals' reproductive success. Most prior studies have relied on an assumption that the environment in which individuals evolve is time-invariant, meaning the individuals play a fixed game throughout the evolutionary process. However, this assumption is not always realistic and can represent an oversimplification of reality [11] , as many experimental studies have shown that the environment individuals face changes over time (and often) [12] [13] [14] [15] . Typically, overgrazing leads to the degradation of the common pasture land, leaving herders with fewer resources to utilize in subsequent seasons. By constraining the number of livestock within a reasonable range, herders can achieve a more sustainable use of pasture land [16] . In this type of population, individuals' actions influence the state of environment, which in turn impacts the actions taken by its members. Apart from endogenous factors like individuals' actions, exogenous factors like seasonal climate fluctuations and soil conditions can also modify the environment experienced by the individuals. Examples are not limited to human-related activities but also appear in various microbial systems including bacteria and viruses [14, 15] .
In this study, we use graphs to model a population's spatial structure, where nodes represent individuals and edges describe their interactions. We propose a framework of evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions: individuals sharing an edge interact ("play a game") in each time step, and their strategic actions together with the game played determine the game to be played in the next time step. We find that the game transitions can lower the threshold for establishing cooperation by k , which means b/c > k − k , where k describes how the game transitions affect the evolutionary outcome. We find that even if cooperation is opposed in each individual game, game transitions can favor the evolution of cooperation. In particular, a slight difference between games can dramatically lower the barrier for the success of cooperators. Our work provides a possible explanation for widespread cooperation. It also suggests that transitions between games, if designed properly, give a promising mechanism for overcoming social dilemmas and achieving global cooperation.
Models
We study a population of N players consisting of cooperators and defectors. The population structure is described by a graph. Each player occupies a node on the graph. Edges between nodes describe the events related to interactions and biological reproduction (or behavior imitation). In each time step, each player interacts separately with every neighbor, and the games played in different interactions can be distinct (Fig. 1A) . When playing game i, mutual cooperation brings each player a "reward", R i , whereas mutual defection leads to an outcome of "punishment", P i ; unilateral cooperation leads to a "sucker's payoff", S i , for the cooperator and a "temptation", T i , for the defector. We assume that each game is a prisoner's dilemma, meaning T i > R i > P i > S i . Each player derives an accumulated payoff, π, from all interactions, and this payoff is translated into reproductive fitness using the formula f = 1 − δ + δπ, where δ 0 represents the intensity of selection [17] . We are concerned with the effects of weak selection [18, 19] , meaning 0 < δ 1. At the end of each time step, one player is selected for death uniformly at random from the population. The neighbors of this player then compete for the empty site, with each neighbor sending an offspring to this location with probability proportional to fitness. Following this "death-birth" update step, the games played in the population also update based on the previous games played and the actions taken in those games (Fig. 1B) . For the player occupying the empty site, the games it will play are determined by the interactions of the prior occupant.
The game transition can be deterministic or stochastic (probabilistic). Deterministic transitions are just special cases of stochastic transitions. If the game to be played is independent of the previous game, then the game transition is "state-independent" [11] . When the game that will be played depends entirely on the previous game, the game transition is "behavior-independent". The simplest case is that games in all interactions are identical initially and remain constant throughout the evolutionary process, which corresponds to the classical setup in most prior studies [3] .
Results
In the absence of mutation, a finite population will eventually reach a monomorphic state in which all players have the same strategy, either all-cooperation or all-defection. We study the competition between cooperation and defection by comparing the fixation probability of a single cooperator, ρ C , to that of a single defector, ρ D . Concretely, ρ C is the probability that a cooperator starting in a random location generates a lineage that takes over the entire population. Analogously, ρ D is the probability that a defector in a random position turns a population of cooperators into defectors. We say that selection favors cooperators relative to defectors if ρ C > ρ D [17] .
3.1. Game transitions between two states. We begin with the case of deterministic game transitions between two states. Here each state corresponds to a donation game ( Fig. 2A ; see SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4 for a comprehensive investigation of two-state games). In game 1, a cooperator bears a cost of c to bring its opponent a benefit of b 1 , and the defector does nothing. Analogously, in game 2, a cooperator pays a cost of c to bring its opponent a benefit of b 2 . That is, R i = b i − c, S i = −c, T i = b i , and P i = 0 in game i. Both b 1 and b 2 are larger than c. The preferred choice for each player is defection, but R i > P i in each game, resulting in the dilemma of cooperation. We say that game i is more valuable than game j if b i > b j . Assuming b 1 > b 2 , the game transitions outlined in Fig. 2A imply that mutual cooperation leads to a more valuable game than any other combination of actions since it is the only way to move to and stay in game 1.
If every player has k neighbors (i.e. the graph is "regular"), we find that
where ∆b = b 1 − b 2 and ξ = (k − 1) /2. Note that ξ is positive and independent of payoff values such as b 1 , b 2 and c. We obtain this condition under weak selection and based on the assumption that the population size N is much larger than k. When b 1 = b 2 , the two games are the same, which leads to the well-known rule of b 1 /c > k for cooperation evolving on regular graphs [3] . The existence of the term ξ∆b/c indicates that transitions between different games can reduce the barrier for the success of cooperation. Even when both games oppose cooperation individually, i.e. b 1 /c < k and b 2 /c < k, transitions between them such as those described in Fig. 2A can promote cooperation (see Fig. 2B ). Our analytical results agree well with numerical simulations. The beneficial effects of stochastic game transitions on cooperation become more prominent on graphs with a large degree, k. We find that a slight difference between games 1 and 2, ∆b, can remarkably lower the barrier for cooperation evolving. For example, when k = 100 and c = 1, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b 1 /c) * decreases from 100 to 50.5 for ∆b = 1.0 (Fig. 2C) . Therefore, stochastic game transitions may provide a possible explanation for the persistence of cooperation in realistic and highly-connected societies [9] . We find that similar results hold under the closely-related "imitation" update rule (SI Appendix, Fig.  S1 and section 3).
Next, we consider "birth-death" [20] and "pairwise-comparison" [21, 22] updating. Under birth-death updating, in each time step a random player is selected for reproduction with probability proportional to its fitness. The offspring replaces a random neighbor. Under pairwise-comparison updating, a player is first selected uniformly-at-random to update his or her strategy. When player i is chosen for a strategy updating, it randomly chooses a neighbor j and compares payoffs. If π i and π j are the payoffs to i and j, respectively, player i adopts j's strategy with probability 1/ 1 + exp δ π i − π j and retains its old strategy otherwise. For the game transition pattern shown Fig. 2A , under both birth-death and pairwisecomparison updating, we have the simple rule (SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4)
where ξ = 1/2. When the two games are the same, ∆b = 0. Therefore, cooperators are never favored over defectors when the players play a fixed game (Fig. 3AC ). Stochastic game transitions provide a chance for cooperation to thrive as long as b 1 − b 2 > c/ξ, which opens an avenue for the evolution of cooperation under birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating. One can attribute this result to the fact that under the transition pattern of Fig. 2A , mutual cooperation results in b 1 − c but when two players use different actions, the cooperator gets −c and the defector gets b 2 . If b 1 − b 2 > c/ξ, then it must be true that b 1 − c > b 2 , which means that the players are effectively in a coordination game with a preferred outcome of mutual cooperation. More intriguingly, Eq. 2 shows that the success of cooperators fully relies on the difference between benefits provided by an altruistic behavior in game 1 and game 2, and it is independent of the exact value in each game (Fig. 3BD) . Thus, in a dense population where individuals have many neighbors, even if the benefits provided by an altruistic behavior are low in both game 1 and game 2, transitions between them can still support the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we stress that the difference between the two games required to favor cooperation is surprisingly small. For example, b 1 − b 2 > 2c warrants the success of cooperation over defection on graphs of any degree.
We further examine random graphs [23] and scale-free networks [24] , where players differ in the number of their neighbors (SI Appendix, Fig. S2 ). We find that the stochastic game transitions can provide more advantages for the evolution of cooperation than their static counterparts under death-birth and imitation updating, and it gives a way for cooperation to evolve under birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating. In addition, we study evolutionary processes with mutation or behavior exploration (SI Appendix, Fig. S3 ). The results demonstrate the robustness of the effects of game transitions on the evolution of cooperation.
3.2. Game transitions among n states. We proceed with the general setup of game transitions among n states (i.e. games 1 through n). If two players play game i in the current time step and among them there are s ∈ {0, 1, 2} cooperators, they will play game j in the next time step with probability p (s) ij . s is 2 for mutual cooperation, 1 for unilateral cooperation/defection, and 0 for mutual defection. In the example of Fig. 2A , we have n = 2 and p (0) 12 = 1 since mutual defection (s = 0) leads to the game transition from game 1 (i = 1) to game 2 (j = 2). This setup can recover deterministic or probabilistic transitions, statedependent or -independent (SI Appendix, section 4), behavior-dependent or -independent (SI Appendix, section 4), and the traditional framework for playing only a single game [3, 5, 6] , as specific cases. We assume that all games are donation games (see SI Appendix, section 3 for any two-player, two-strategy game). In game i, a cooperator pays a cost of c to bring its opponent a benefit of b i . Game 1 is the most valuable, meaning b 1 b i for every i.
Under death-birth updating, we find that
where, for every i, ∆b 1i = b 1 − b i , and ξ i depends on the game transition pattern but is independent of the benefit in each game, b i , and cost, c (see SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4 for the calculation of ξ i ). In fact, the effects of stochastic game transitions on cooperation arise from two sources: the game transition pattern and the variation in games. The former is captured by ξ i and the latter by ∆b 1i /c. Eq. 3 shows that the term, ∑ n i=2 ξ i ∆b 1i /c, exactly captures how stochastic game transitions influence cooperation. Let k denote ∑ n i=2 ξ i ∆b 1i /c and let b denote b 1 . We can interpret Eq. 3 intuitively: weak selection favors cooperation if the ratio of the benefit from an altruistic behavior, b, to its cost, c, exceeds the average effective number of neighbors, k − k . Analogously, under birth-death or pairwise-comparison updating, we find that
We refer the reader to SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4 for the calculation of ξ i . Eq. 3 tells us how different environmental transition patterns affect the evolution of a system. In a twoplayer interaction, players' behavior profiles can be mutual cooperation, unilateral cooperation/defection, or mutual defection. We can ask under which behavior profile the game transition has the most prominent impact on evolutionary outcomes. Answering this question is of practical importance since it provides us with insight into finding the right time to intervene in the environment in order to achieve a sociallyoptimal evolutionary outcome for the population.
We study transitions among three states, namely, the most valuable game (game 1), a moderately valuable game (game 2), and the least valuable game (game 3). We fix the game transition patterns for two behavior profiles and test how varying the transition pattern for the third behavior profile affects the threshold for establishing cooperation (Fig. 4) . For example, Fig. 4A shows that when defection (either 1C or 0C) leads to game 1, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b 1 /c) * changes notably as the transition pattern responding to mutual cooperation (2C) varies. We find similar results for the behavior profile of unilateral cooperation/defection (Fig. 4B ). When the transition pattern responding to mutual defection varies, however, the effects on cooperation are negligible (Fig. 4C) . Therefore, game transitions in response to the behavior profile of mutual cooperation or unilateral cooperation/defection can have extremely important effects on evolutionary outcomes. To build a cooperative society, game transitions responding to the two behavior profiles should be carefully designed. A simple and efficient solution is transitioning to the most valuable game once the two players cooperate and to the least valuable game immediately once defection appears.
3.3. Pure versus stochastic strategies. So far, in every time step each player is either a cooperator or a defector. But the framework we propose here has a much broader scope than just two pure strategies. For example, we also investigate the competition between stochastic strategies under stochastic game transitions. Let s p denote a stochastic strategy with which, in each time step, a player chooses cooperation with probability p and defects otherwise. s 1 thus corresponds to a pure cooperator and s 0 a pure defector. We find that the condition for s p being favored by selection over s q still follows the format of Eq. 3 under death-birth updating and Eq. 4 under birth-death/pairwise-comparison updating, provided that ξ i is modified (SI Appendix, sections 3 and 4). When the game transition patterns follow Fig. 2A under death-birth updating, stochastic game transitions lower the threshold for a cooperative strategy (s p with a large p) being favored relative to a less cooperative strategy. We also find that game transitions can favor the evolution of a cooperative stochastic strategy under birth-death/pairwise-comparison updating.
3.4. Global versus local game transitions. Our study above assumes that in each time step, games played by any two players are likely to update ("global" transitions). But in some cases, players could present different tendencies in modifying the environment in which they evolve. For example, under death-birth updating, if player i is selected for death, then only i's nearest neighbors compete to reproduce and replace i with an offspring. Compared with those not involved in competition to the vacant site, individuals close to the individual to be replaced have stronger incentives to change the environment they face, since the environment indeed affects their success of the replacement. In other words, games played by the nearest neighbors of the dead drive the evolution of a system. Therefore one could impose transitions only to these games, leading to "local" transitions (see Fig. 5A ). Birth-death updating requires competition at the population level, so global and local transitions are identical in this case. For death-birth and pairwise-comparison updating, global and local transitions lead to decidedly different models. We show that, however, the simple rules for cooperation to evolve (Eqs. 3 and 4) still hold provided ξ i is modified (SI Appendix, section 1). Specifically, when the game transition pattern follows Fig According to the nature of the critical threshold (b 1 /c > k − ξ∆b/c for death-birth updating and ξ∆b/c > 1 for pairwise-comparison updating), global transitions act as a more effective promoter of cooperation than local transitions do (Fig. 5BC) . But for both kinds of game transitions, many messages are qualitatively the same: game transitions promote cooperation (Fig. 2, Fig. 3 , SI Appendix, Fig. S4) ; game transitions notably amplify the beneficial effects of game variations on cooperation (Fig. 2, Fig.  3 , SI Appendix, Fig. S5 ); and game transitions responding to mutual cooperation or unilateral cooperation/defection critically affect cooperation (Fig. 4, SI Appendix, Fig. S6 ). We include a more detailed discussion of global versus local game transitions in SI Appendix.
Discussion
In this work, we consider evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions, coupling individuals' actions with the environment. Individuals' behaviors modify the environment, which in turn affects the viability of future actions in that environment. We find a simple rule for the success of cooperators in an environment that can switch between an arbitrary number of states, namely b/c > k − k , where k exactly captures how the games and their transitions affect the evolution of cooperation. When all environmental states are identical, we recover the rule b/c > k [3] .
We first study an intuitive scenario: mutual cooperation leads to a valuable game while the existence of defection results in a relatively undesirable game. We find that even if both of the games oppose cooperation individually, transitions between them can allow cooperation to flourish. Moreover, the success of cooperators largely depends on the variation in the two games, and even a slight variation can remarkably lower the threshold for establishing cooperation.
For birth-death and pairwise-comparison updating, weak selection disfavors cooperation in any homogeneous structured population when the environment (game) is constant [3, 25] . Given the practical significance of the two update rules [26] , these results are disappointing. However, stochastic game transitions give hope for cooperation evolving under the two rules. Importantly, the variation in the two games, rather than what exactly each one is like individually, determines whether or not cooperation is favored over defection. Thus, even when individuals play two relatively undesirable games, cooperation can still flourish due to game transitions.
Our findings are of great significance to understanding large-scale cooperation in many highly-connected social networks. In these networks, an individual can have hundreds of neighbors [9, 27] , and cooperators thus face the risk of being exploited by lots of neighboring defectors. If the environment remains constant, cooperation must be profitable enough to make up for exploitation by defection-the benefit produced by a cooperative behavior should be hundreds of times as large as its cost [3] . This requirement is often unrealistic in real-world social networks. Stochastic game transitions thus provide a possible explanation for the prevailing cooperation in such populations. Our findings hold for various populations structures, from regular and random graphs to scale-free networks.
The main reason that spatial structure can promote cooperation is that local strategy dispersal leads to an assortment of cooperators [2, 3] . Cooperators can resist the invasion of defectors through more interactions with cooperators. But when mutation or random strategy exploration is allowed, a defector is expected to arise within a cluster of cooperators, which then dilutes the spatial assortment. Mutation thus hinders the evolution of cooperation [28] . When the environment changes as a result of individuals' behaviors, although the defecting mutant indeed exploits its neighboring cooperators temporarily, the environment in which this happens deteriorates rapidly. As a result, the temptation to defect is weakened. In addition, in a constant environment selection favors the establishment of spatial assortment while mutation destroys it continuously. The population state finally reaches a "mutation-selection stationary (MSS)" distribution. But when the environment is subject to transitions, the interacting environment would also be a part of this distribution. We refer to the joint distribution over individuals' states and games as a "game-mutation-selection stationary (GMSS)" distribution, which is an important avenue for future investigations.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in exploring evolutionary dynamics in a changing environment [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . Our framework here is somewhat different. First, our study accounts for both exogenous factors and individuals' behaviors in the change of the environment, modeling general environmental feedback. In addition, the environment that two players face is independent of that for another pair of players. Individuals' strategic behaviors directly influence the environment in which they evolve, which enables an individual to reciprocate with its opponent in a single interaction through environmental feedback. Therefore, even if cooperators are disfavored in each individual environment, cooperators can still be favored over defectors through environmental reciprocity. Such an effect has never been observed in prior studies where all individuals interact in a homogeneous environment [29, 31] . In those studies, although at different times the environments individuals face are different, at any specific stage the environment is identical for all individuals. When defection is a dominant strategy in each individual environment, defection also dominates cooperation in the context of an ever-changing environment [29] [30] [31] . In a recent seminal work, Hilbe et. al. found that individuals can rely on repeated interactions and continuous strategies to achieve environmental reciprocity [11] . Compared with their model, in our setup individuals play a one-shot game with a pure, unconditional strategy. Our framework shows that without relying on direct reciprocity and any strategic complexity, stochastic game transitions still promote the evolution of cooperation.
The mathematical formulas obtained herein tell us which environmental transition patterns facilitate cooperation and provide possible solutions to relax the dilemma of cooperation. To achieve this, a simple and effective transition pattern is one in which mutual cooperation leads to a valuable game, while defection leads to an immediate transition to a less-desirable game. In this paper, we incorporate interdependence of the interacting environment and individuals' behaviors into an evolving population. Within this framework, we can further discuss many important issues. For example, by adjusting the transition probability, we can study how different time scales for the evolution of strategies and for the transition of environment affect evolutionary outcomes [31] . In addition, playing edge-dependent games in structured populations has attracted much attention [37, 38] . A prior study has found that when the environment in each interaction is edge-dependent, the evolutionary process can be approximated by that in a transformed and unified environment [37] . Our work provides further, promising results about the dynamics of edge-dependent games. Figure 1 . Stochastic game transitions on graphs. Each player occupies a node on the graph and has a strategic behavior (blue/cooperate or red/defect) used in interactions with neighbors (A). In each time step, each player plays a game with every neighbor and accumulates its payoffs from all interactions. Games in different interactions can be different, highlighted by the color of edges and relevant payoff matrices. At the end of each time step, a random player is selected to be replaced and all games update. Players' behaviors and the game they played in one time step determine the game to be played in the next time step (B). For example, if both players choose to take "red" behaviors in game 1, i.e. mutual defection, then they will play game 2 in the subsequent time step. We study transitions between three donation games, game 1 (the most valuable game), game 2 (a moderately valuable game), and game 3 (the least valuable game). We take ∆b 12 = 1, ∆b 13 = 2, and c = 1. Players' behaviors determine the game to be played in the next time step. We fix transition patterns for two behavior profiles and study how varying the transition pattern for the third behavior profile changes the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, , where the game transition pattern is given in Fig. 2A . Game transitions, regardless of whether they are global or local, can promote cooperation markedly, although in this case global transitions result in a more relaxed condition for the evolution of cooperation than do local transitions.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (SI)
The supplementary information is structured as follows.
In Section 1, we derive a general expression of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for local game transitions. We study three updating processes, namely death-birth, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating. The birth-death updating process leads to the same result under both local game transitions and global game transitions. We investigate this process in Section 4.
In Section 2, we discuss how the initial conditions (the initial fractions of various games played in the population) affect the evolutionary outcomes. We provide an effective approach to evaluate the sensitivity of evolutionary dynamics to the initial condition.
In Section 3, we derive a general expression of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio for global game transitions. We study four updating processes, namely death-birth, birth-death, imitation, and pairwise comparison updating. We prove that our rules also apply to the case when players use stochastic strategies (cooperate or defect with a probability rather than unconditionally).
In Section 4, we study four representative examples, including state-independent game transitions (the game to be played is independent of the previous games played), strategy-independent game transitions (the game to be played is independent of interactants' strategic actions in the past), game transitions between two states (the example shown in the main text), and probabilistic game transitions between three states (transitions between different games with a probability). We show that how probabilistic game transitions affect the favorable effects of game transitions on cooperation may depend on the variations in different games.
section 1. Evolutionary dynamics with local stochastic game transitions
Here we consider stochastic game transitions among n states, described by game 1, game 2, · · · , game n. The payoff structure of game i is
where each value corresponds to a payoff derived by a player with a strategy in the column against a player with a strategy in the row. The game transition pattern is described by three matrixes, i.e.,
where p (s) ij represents the probability that players play game j in the next time step conditioned on that they play game i in the current time step and there are s A-players, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and s ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
On graphs or social networks, each player occupies a node. If two players (or nodes occupied by players) are connected by an edge or a social tie, they play a one-shot game in each time step. The main idea about the theoretical analysis is to couple the game played by two connected players and their strategy profiles into edges. Let E (i) XY denote an edge in which the two connected players take strategy X and Y respectively (X, Y ∈ {A, B}) and they play game i in the current time step (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}). For example, in edge E (1) AA , both the two connected players take A strategy and they play game 1. We then introduce the following variables to describe this evolving system: p A : the frequency of A-players; p B : the frequency of B-players;
: the probability to find an edge E (i) XY given that one node of this edge is occupied by a Y−player; p XY : the frequency of edges that connect an X-player and a Y-player; q X|Y : the conditional probability to find an X−player given that the adjacent node is occupied by a Y−player.
Then we have the identities
Note that players' strategies and the game they play coevolve throughout the evolutionary process. From the perspective of network dynamics, we need to consider the change in the frequency of nodes occupied by A−players and the frequency of edge E (i)
XY . Based on above identities, we can use p A and q
to describe the whole system. In the following, we study a random regular graph, where each node is linked to other k nodes. 0.1. Death-birth updating process. In the death-birth updating process, in each time step, a random player is selected to die; then all neighbors compete to reproduce an offspring and this offspring occupies the vacant site with the probability proportional to its fitness. We can also depict it in a social setting: a random player i determines to update its strategy; subsequently, it adopts a neighbor's strategy with a probability proportional to the neighbor's fitness. The local transitions account for the fact that only the nearest neighbors compete for the vacancy site. Compared with other players not involved in the competition, these neighbors are more incentivized to modify the environment in which they evolve, namely, the games they played. Therefore, under local game transitions, only games played by the nearest neighbors of the dead have the chance to update. We first investigate the change in the frequency of A−players. 0.1.1. Change in p A -updating a B-player. A B-player is chosen to die with probability p B . Let k 
The probability for such a neighborhood configuration is
The fitness of a neighboring A-player with who the focal player plays game i is
The fitness of a neighboring B-player with who the focal player plays game i is
The probability that one of neighboring A−players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood configuration is given by
The probability that one of neighboring B−players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood configuration is given by
Therefore, p A increases by 1/N with probability
0.1.2. Change in p A -updating a A-player. A A-player is chosen to die with probability p A . Let k
denote the number of neighboring A-players with who the focal player plays game i. Analogously,
denotes the number of neighboring B-players with who the focal player plays game i. Therefore,
The probability that one of neighboring A-players replaces the vacancy under such a neighborhood configuration is given by
Therefore, p A decreases by 1/N with probability
0.1.3. Change in p A . Let us now suppose that one replacement event takes place in one unit of time. The time derivative of p A is given bẏ
where
AA . We proceed with the change in the frequency of each type of edges. Note that when a random player like l is chosen to die, edges between l and its nearest neighbors (abbreviated 'neighbors') and edges between l's nearest neighbors and the next nearest neighbors are likely to change (see the description of local game transitions). We stress that the change in p probably change since games in these edges switch, resulting in the change in edge types.
First we consider the case that a random B-player is chosen to die. We take the same neighborhood configuration as we do in Section 0.1.1, i.e., k
AA results from two parts: the switching of edges connecting the focal B-player and its nearest neighbors, the switching of edges connecting the nearest neighbors and the next nearest neighbors. Under the given neighborhood configuration, the change in p (i) AA due to the former part is
Equation (22) describes the edge switching of E (j)
AA , which occurs when (i) a neighboring A-player occupies the vacant site, i.e., BA → AA; (ii) neighboring A-players who play game j with the dead in the current time step play game i in the next time step, (j) → (i).
The change in p
AA due to edges between the nearest and the next nearest neighbors is
Equation (23) indicates that regardless of which neighbor (A−player or B−player) replaces the focal Bplayer, the change in p
AA due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors remains the same. Then we consider the case that a random A-player is chosen to die. We take the same neighborhood configuration as we do in Section 0.1.2, i.e., k
AA due to edges between the focal A-player and its nearest neighbors is
and
Equation (24) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equation (25) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
AA due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
Analogously, one replacement event takes place in one unit of time. From equations (22, 23, 24, 25, 26) The time derivative of p
AA is given bẏ
where δ ij = 1 if i = j and δ ij = 0 otherwise.
AB . When a B-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same as that in Section 0.1.1, the change in p (i) AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
Equation (28) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equation (29) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
The change in p (i)
AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is P ∆p
When an A-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same as that in Section 0.1.2, the change in p
AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
Equation (31) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equation (32) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
Analogously, we havė
0.1.6. Change in p
BB . When a B-player is selected to die and its neighbourhood configuration is the same as that in Section 0.1.1, the change in p (i) AB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
Equation (35) captures the case when a neighboring A-player successfully occupies the vacant site. Equation (36) describes the case that a neighboring B-player successfully occupies the vacant site.
BB due to edges between the nearest and next nearest neighbors is
The derivative of p
0.1.7. Different time scales. From equation (27) , we havė
When the intensity of selection is weak (δ 1), q A|A reaches the equilibrium point much faster than p A [see equations (20) and (42)]. Thus the dynamical system converges quickly onto the slow manifold witḣ q A|A = 0. We have
We define a function A R (s) mapping (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrix R (s) to a 3(n − 1) × 3(n − 1) matrix, given by
where α = (k − 2)(1 − p A ) and β = (k − 2)p A . Then we use P (2) , P (1) and P (0) in equation (6) to define (n − 1) × (n − 1) matrixes, given bȳ
where s ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Let b denote a column vector with 3(n − 1) entries: the first n − 1 entries are p AA ; the next n − 1 entries are p AB ; the last n − 1 entries are p BB . Let v denote a column vector (p
XY , we can reduce the system of equations (27, 34, 40) 
For a linear system described by equation (46), its equilibrium points can be obtained by solving
, all eigenvalues ofĀ are negative numbers or complex numbers with negative real parts, the system is asymptotically stable and has a single equilibrium point given by [1] 
Ultimately, the system approaches to the equilibrium point, regardless of the initial state of (p
In other words, the initial fractions of various games do not affect the evolutionary outcome. We state that none ofĀ's eigenvalues can be positive, since this leads to a few terms in v increasing above 1 or decreasing below 0 [1] , which is unrealistic in the current system. ButĀ may have zero eigenvalues. In such cases, the system described by equation (46) has more than one equilibrium points. The initial state of (p
T decides the equilibrium point that the system approaches. That is, the initial fractions of various games influence the evolutionary outcome. In Section 2 , we provide a few approaches to efficiently evaluate the dependence of the evolutionary outcome to the initial fractions of various games. 
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. We obtain I R n , I S n , I T n and I P n by separately replacing v i in equation (48a) Here we consider a one-dimensional diffusion process of the random variable p A . Within a short time interval ∆t, we have
The fixation probability φ A (x) of A-players with initial frequency p A (t = 0) = 
The solution of equation (51) 
In equation (53), the third equality holds when δ is sufficiently small. 0.1.9. Fixation probability. In a population of B-players, when a fraction x of B-players mutate to A-players, the fixation probability of A-players is
The fixation probability of a fraction x of B-players is
Then the ratio of fixation probabilities is
For sufficiently small x, we have
Overall, for a sufficiently large population and x = 1/N, the condition for cooperation is favored over
Equation (58) 
Substituting payoff structures into equation (58) and using equations (21a,21b,21c,21d), we have the condition for ρ A > ρ B under death-birth updating, given by
Furthermore, we have
Substituting (61) 
Inserting equations (48a) and (48c) into equation (64) 
Imitation updating process.
In each time step, a random player i is selected to evaluate its strategy. This player takes it own strategy or imitates a neighbor's strategy proportional to the fitness. Analyzing the evolutionary process as we do under death-birth updating, we havė
We redefine the function A R (s) as
Then the system under imitation updating can be reduced tȯ
All other variables such as α, β,P (s) ,P (s) , b, v follow those defined under death-birth updating.
Furthermore, under donation games described by equation (59), we have the condition for ρ A > ρ B , given by
Solving equation (68) In each generation, a random player i is selected to evaluate its strategy. This player randomly selects a neighbor j and compares their payoffs. Player i then adopts j's strategy with probability
where π i and π j denote i's and j's payoffs. Otherwise, player i remains its strategy. Analogously, we haveṗ
Then the system under pairwise-comparison updating can be reduced tȯ
By solving equation (75) Here we provide an alternative approach to rapidly judge the dependence of the evolutionary outcome on the initial conditions: Based on the game transition matrix P (2) , P (1) , and P (0) in equation (6), we define a random process with a state space E = 1, 2, · · · , 3n} with 3n states. The probability transition matrix for this random process is given by
The entry in the i th row and the j th column in M is the transition probability from state i to state j. If the defined random process has only one recurrent equivalence class, the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial fractions of various games, regardless of under death-birth, imitation and pairwisecomparison updating rules. But if it has more than one recurrent equivalence classes, the evolutionary outcome is sensitive to the initial fractions of various games. For a random process defined by a state space E and a probability transition matrix M, we can examine its recurrent equivalence class like this: lettingM = ∑ 3n i=1 M i , the above random process has only one recurrent equivalence class if and only if inM there exists at least some is (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) satisfying that all entries in the i th column are positive; the random process has more than one recurrent equivalence classes if and only if inM for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) there exists at least an entry of 0 in the i th column. Here we give detailed explanations. The sign of each entry inM, takingM ij (the entry in the i th row and the j th column inM) for example, actually indicates the transition possibility (not probability) from state i to state j within 3n-step transitions (less than or equal to 3n steps).M ij > 0 means that the system can transit from state i to j through 3n or less than 3n times of transitions. ForM ij = 0, the transition is unlikely to happen within 3n steps, which indicates that the system entering into state i can never transit to state j. If there exists some js (1 ≤ j ≤ 3n) satisfying that all entries in the j th column ofM are positive, any state can transit to state j and thus state j lies in a recurrent equivalence class. In such a situation, if there is another recurrent equivalence class, any state lying in the second class is unlikely to transit to state j, which leads to contradictions. Therefore a column of positive entries suggests a single recurrent equivalent class. Similarly, if there is only a recurrent equivalent class, any state can transit to one state in the recurrent equivalent class. Thus there certainly exists a column of positive entries. Analogously, we can prove that the lacking of a column of positive entries suggests more than one recurrent equivalence classes. We provide examples with two states for a better understanding of these approaches. The game transition matrixes are
Then we have 
There exist entries of 0 in every column ofM. Thus there are more than one recurrent equivalence classes and the initial fractions of various games affect the evolutionary outcomes. As a consistent check, we calculate the eigenvalues of A P (s) − 2k 2 I /(kN) in equation (46), given by λ 1 = 0, λ 2 = −(k − 2)/(Nk), and λ 3 = −(2k − 2)/(Nk). The eigenvalue of λ 1 = 0 also confirms the sensitivity of the evolutionary outcome to the initial conditions. In Section 0.6 we illustrate how to calculate ξ i in this system. Then we present a different example. The game transition matrixes are
Actually, this case corresponds to the game transition pattern shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. Then we have 
Except for entries in the fifth column, all other entries inM are positive. Thus there is only a recurrent equivalent class. The evolutionary outcome is insensitive to the initial condition. As a consistent check, we calculate the eigenvalues of A P (s) − 2k 2 I /(kN) in equation (46), given by λ 1 = −2k/N, λ 2 = −2k/N, and λ 3 = −2k/N. Therefore, the system has a unique equilibrium root and the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial condition. In Section 0.6, we illustrate how to calculate ξ i in this system. Next, we briefly explain why the recurrent equivalence class of the defined random process can predict the sensitivity of the evolutionary outcome to the initial conditions. The main idea in the explanation is whether or not the initially assigned game between two connected players decides the game they play in the evolutionary process later. For example, the transition pattern we illustrate in equation (79) describes that if two individuals initially play game 1, regardless of their strategic actions, they will play game 1 throughout the evolution. Obviously, the initial game decides the game they play later. Therefore the initial condition affects the evolutionary outcome.
We rename the elements in the state space E as E
BB , where the i th entry corresponds to the original state i. In the following, we analyze the state transition of an edge throughout the evolution and we show that M captures such a transition. As defined in Section 1, the state of an edge is given by E (i) XY , where X, Y ∈ {A, B} and i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}. X and Y are strategies of the two connected players and i is the game they play. The transition of an edge state can arise from two parts: the change in players' strategies, the change in the game they play. Let AA denote both players taking A-strategies, AB denote one player taking A−strategy and the other taking B-strategy, BB denote both players taking B−strategies. Note that in the current model, in each generation, only a player has chance to update its strategy. Thus, the strategy transition follows (i) AA can remain in AA or transit to AB but can not transit to BB; (ii) AB can remain in AB or transit to AA or BB; (iii) BB can remain in BB or transit to AB but can not transit to AA. That is, for any i and j, E (i)
AA and E (j) BB are unlikely to transit to each other, corresponding to the two null matrixes in M [see 0 in equation (78)]. The transition of the game is governed by P (2) , P (1) and P (0) . For example, P (2) tells whether or not an edge of E (i)
AB in an update step (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}), corresponding to those terms including P (2) in M. Note that the realistic evolutionary process is much more complicated and it is impossible to obtain the exact transition probability of an edge from one state to another, but matrix M can describes the possibility that an edge of E
in an update step. The zero entries in M indicate the transition can never happen and the nonzero entries suggest the transition is likely to happen.
When the random process has only one recurrent equivalence class, let c denote the set of all states lying in the recurrent equivalence class. Equations (20), (27) , (34) , and (40) show that for a sufficiently small δ, the fractions of various edges change much faster than the fractions of the two strategies. That is, although there is a frequent transition between A-players and B-players, namely, an A-player transiting to a B-player or a B-player transiting to an A-player, the fraction of A-players varies at a greatly slow rate. In the evolutionary process, an edge transits among various states as the strategies adopted by the connected individuals and the game they play change. The state transition possibility of an edge is described by M. Eventually, the state of this edge enters into the recurrent equivalence class c and can never escape from c, regardless of its initial state. Thus, if the random process defined above has only one recurrent equivalent class, the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial condition.
When the random process has m (> 1) recurrent equivalence classes, we denote them by c 1 ,
within one update step. We apply two propositions below:
(ii) in every equivalence class like c j , there exists some is satisfying E
AA is a recurrent state, there exists l making either E (l)
AA is impossible since in each generation just one player has the change to update its strategy. E (l)
AB due to the strategy transition, leading to E
AB due to the game transition, leading to E
Otherwise an edge state lies in two different recurrent equivalence classes, which leads to contradictions. Based on the proof to proposition (i), every equivalence class includes at lease one state with the form of
AB ∈ c j . Due to the game transition, there must exist l making E (i)
AB and E (l) AB ∈ c j . In addition, due to the strategy transition, we have E
AB and E (l) BB . Proposition (i) stresses that when an edge transits into a state that lies in an recurrent equivalence class like c j 1 , games to be played by the two connected players are limited by c j 1 . If the edge transits into a state in another recurrent equivalence class like c j 2 , the two connected players can only play games limited by c j 2 . In particular, the games limited by c j 1 and those by c j 2 are completely different. The initial condition affects which recurrent equivalence class an edge will transit into. A representative example is that for
BB ∈ c j 2 , when all players play game i 1 initially, the games to be played are limited by c j 1 throughout the evolution. But if initially all players play game i 2 , c j 2 constrains the games to be played throughout the evolution. Therefore, the initial fractions of games affect the evolutionary outcomes.
We examine the above approach by 10 8 tests. In every test, we generate three 4 × 4 random matrixes in which all entries are nonnegative. We normalize these matrixes to make the sum of entries in each row 1. The three matrixes are assigned to P (2) , P (1) and P (0) . On the one hand, based on P (2) , P (1) and P (0) , we calculate the eigenvalues of A P (s) − 2k 2 I /(kN) in equation (46) and record whether or not there are zero eigenvalues. On the other, based on P (2) , P (1) and P (0) , we calculateM and record whether or not there are some is satisfying that all entries in the i th column ofM are positive. In all tests, whenever there is zero entry in each column ofM, there are zero eigenvalues. As long as there exists some i satisfying that all entries in the i th column ofM are positive, there is no any zero eigenvalue. Thus, our approach well predicts the sensitivity of the evolutionary outcomes to the initial conditions. Furthermore, for P (2) , P (1) and P (0) under which the evolutionary outcome is sensitive to the initial condition, a slight perturbation or noise to the game transition pattern (to P (2) , P (1) and P (0) ) can turn this system into one insensitive to the initial condition. A simple way to achieve this is adding each entry in P (2) , P (1) and P (0) by an arbitrary small number δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 , where δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 are not necessary identical. In this section, we study the evolutionary dynamics with global stochastic game transitions. In each time step, all games have the chance to update. We consider the game transition pattern [defined by P (2) , P (1) , P (0) , see equation (6) ] that makes the evolutionary outcome insensitive to the initial condition (see Section 2 for more details). Since in each time step, only one player among the whole population has the chance to update its strategy whereas all games are likely to update, the evolutionary rate of the game in an interaction (or in an edge) is much larger than that of strategies taken by two connected players. That is, for two connected players, before their strategies update, the game they play updates for many times. Therefore, the probability with which they play a specific game reaches a stationary distribution. We can approximate the game to be played by the 'average' of the stationary distribution. For example, for two cooperators, the stationary distribution of games they play, denoted by u (2) 
where the i th term in u (2) is the frequency at which the two players play game i. The average payoff for the two cooperators is ∑
(2) i = 1. Analogously, the stationary distribution of games played by a cooperator and a defector, denoted by u (1) , is given by
The average payoff for the cooperator is ∑
i S i and that for the defector is ∑
i T i . The stationary distribution of games played by two defectors, denoted by u (0) , is given by
The average payoff for the two defectors is ∑ n i=1 u
i P i . Overall, the payoff structure corresponding to the 'average' game is
which is independent of updating rules such as death-birth, imitation, pairwise-comparison, and birthdeath updating. Under the death-birth updating, in equation (58), replacing R i , S i , T i and P i withR,S,T andP, then inserting equations (48a,48b,48c,48d), we reduce equation (58) to
Under donation games with R i = b i − c, S i = −c, T i = b i and P i = 0, equation (89) can be further reduced as equation (63), where
Similarly, under the imitation updating, we can reduce equation (58) to
which can be further reduced to equation (69) under donation games, where
Under both pairwise-comparison and birth-death updating rules, natural selection favors cooperation over defection if
which can be further reduced to equation (76) under donation games, where
Up to this point, we focus on the case where each player is either a pure cooperator or a pure defector. In each time step, such a cooperator certainly chooses cooperation and a defector must defect. Here, we further investigate the case where players take stochastic strategies, i.e., taking cooperation with a probability and defection otherwise. Let s p and s q denote two stochastic strategies. Players taking s p cooperate with probability p and defect with probability 1 − p. If taking s q , players choose cooperation with probability q and defection with probability 1 − q. Analogously, for two connected players, before one of them updates its strategy (i.e., s p or s q ), their actions (i.e., cooperation or defection ) and the games they played update for many times. We thus can approximate their expected payoff by assuming that they play a repeated game with a sufficiently large number of rounds. One's expected payoff is given by its average payoffs per round. Then players use the derived payoffs to update their strategies, i.e., s p and s q . We study the competition between s p and s q . This model can recover the case we explored above as a specific case, namely, the case with p = 1 (pure cooperators) and q = 0 (pure defectors). For two interacting players, one taking s p and the other taking s q , let u (pq) i,r1,r2 (t) denote the probability that in round t they play game i, the player with s p chooses r 1 and the player with s q chooses r 2 , where i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and r 1 , r 2 ∈ {0, 1} (0 represents defection and 1 means cooperation). Then we have
Assuming that the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial conditions, there exists a stationary distribution of games and players' actions before two interacting players update strategies. Let
indicates the fraction of interactions in which two players play game i and the one with strategy s p chooses action r 1 and the other with strategy s q chooses action r 2 . From equations (95a,95b,95c,95d), we have
We can get the stationary distribution u (pq) by the left eigenvector with ∑ 1
Actually, lettingū (pq) = (u
n ) and solvinḡ
, and u
. The expected payoff for a player with strategy s p against one with strategy s q is
Under the death-birth updating, the condition for strategy s p to be favored over s q (i.e., ρ s p > ρ s q ) is given by
We say that a stochastic strategy is more cooperative if players with such a strategy choose cooperation with a larger probability. That is, for p > q, s p is more cooperative than another strategy s q . Under donation games described by equation (59), equation (99) can be reduced to equation (63), where
Similarly, under imitation updating and donation games, natural selection favors s p over s q if equation (69) holds, where
For birth-death or pairwise-comparison updating, under donation games, s p wins over s q if equation (76) holds, where
section 4. Representative examples
Here we illustrate four representative examples under donation games. The results for arbitrary twoplayer games can be derived analogously. 0.4. Evolutionary dynamics with state-independent game transitions. If the game played in one time step has no effects on the game to be played in the next time step, the game transition is state-independent, namely, p
jm for any i and j. The number of A-players determines the game to be played. We let p
m . We consider the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is independent of the initial conditions. For local games transitions, we have Death-birth :
Imitation :
For global game transitions, we have Death-birth :
Pairwise-comparison/Birth-death :
In particular, if p (s) m = 1/n for all m and s, the game transition is fully stochastic. In the next time step, any game occurs with the equal probability. For both local and global game transitions, natural selection favors cooperation over defection (ρ C > ρ D ) if
Death-birth
We find that the evolutionary process with stochastic and diverse games can be approximated by that under a static and unified game. 0.5. Evolutionary dynamics with strategy-independent game transitions. The stochastic game transition is strategy-independent when the game to be played next time step is independent of players' strategic behaviors in prior interactions. That is, P (2) = P (1) = P (0) . Let P (2) = P (1) = P (0) = P. Here we consider the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is insensitive to the initial conditions. For global game transitions, we introduce a vector u = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n }, which satisfies u = uP. Then we have Death-birth :
Note that in pairwise-comparison/birth-death, ξ i = 0 means that cooperation can never evolve regardless of the benefit provided by a cooperative behavior in the donation game. In other words, if the game is independent of interactants' strategic actions, stochastic game transitions may not promote cooperation. 0.6. Evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between two states (n = 2). Given the theoretical significance of two states, we provide a systematic investigation of stochastic game transitions between two states. We begin with the game transition pattern under which the evolutionary outcome is insensitive to the initial conditions. According to equation (63), under the death-birth updating process, the general rule for cooperation winning defection is
For global game transitions, we have
For local game transitions, we have
In above equations,
21 . We proceed with a specific game transition pattern involving two states, as illustrated in Fig. 2A 
where ξ = 1/2 for global game transitions and ξ = 10k 2 − 4k + 1 / 24k 2 − 12k for local game transitions. Equation (106) corresponds to equation (2) in the main text. If the game transition pattern follows Fig. 2A in the main text, in the competition between two stochastic strategies, i.e., s p and s q (p > q), from equations (100) and (102), we have 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
By analyzingM, we get E
AA , E
AB , E
BB belonging to one recurrent equivalence class, and E
BB belonging to the other recurrent equivalence class. Thus the original system can be reduced into two subsystems, one consisting of E p = 1 corresponds to the deterministic case. Under the death-birth updating process, the general rule for cooperation wining defection is
Here we analyze how the probabilistic transition measured by p affects the critical benefit-to-cost ratio Figure S1 . Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation. We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between two states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between 2 states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We examine death-birth (A), imitation (B), pairwise-comparison (C), and birth-death (D) updating on random graphs [3] and scale-free networks [4, 5] . The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the critical benefit-to-cost ratios for cooperation winning defection by numerical simulations. The vertical lines present the analytical critical benefit-to-cost ratios based on random regular graphs. The average degree of the random regular graph and the scalefree networks is 4. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. S1 . Stochastic game transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators (ρ C > ρ D ). Figure S3 . Stochastic game transitions can promote cooperation in the presence of mutation/random strategy exploration. We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between 2 states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We investigate the death-birth updating on random regular graphs. With probability 1 − µ, the empty site is occupied by the neighbor's offspring. With probability µ, the empty is occupied by a cooperator or a defector with equal probability. Here the frequency of cooperative strategies f C is used to measure the success of cooperators. Cooperation wins defection if f C > 1/2. We obtain each data point by averaging f C in 100 independent runs. For each run, f C is obtained by averaging the frequency of cooperative strategies in the last 2 × 10 7 after a transient time of 2 × 10 7 time steps. We take N = 500, k = 4, b 2 = b 1 − 1, δ = 0.01, and c = 1. Other parameters: µ = 0.05 (A), µ = 0.1 (B), and µ = 0.4 (C). The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the critical benefit-to-cost ratios for cooperation winning defection ( f C > 1/2). Stochastic games transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators. 
Regular graph
Random graph
Scale-free networks Figure S4 . Local game transitions can promote cooperation. We study evolutionary dynamics with stochastic game transitions between 2 states and the game transition pattern is shown in Fig. 2A in the main text. We examine death-birth (A), imitation (B) and pairwise-comparison (C) on random regular graphs, random graphs, and scale-free networks. The cross points of the dots and the horizontal lines mark the critical benefit-tocost ratios for cooperation winning defection by numerical simulations. The vertical lines present the analytical critical benefit-to-cost ratios. Stochastic game transitions reduce the critical benefit-to-cost for the success of cooperators (ρ C > ρ D ). All parameters are the same as those in Fig. S1 . 
2C
1C 0C Figure S6 . Local game transitions responding to mutual cooperation (2C) and unilateral cooperation/defection (1C) critically affect the evolution of cooperation. We study the transition between three donation games, game 1 (the most valuable game), game 2 (the moderately valuable game), and game 3 (the least valuable game). We take ∆b 12 = 1, ∆b 13 = 2, and c = 1. Players' behaviors determine the game to be played next time step. We fix transition patterns for two behavior profiles and study how varying the transition pattern for the third behavior profile changes the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (b 1 /c) * . Figure S7 . Local probabilistic game transitions can strengthen the promotive effects of game transitions on cooperation. We study the transition among three games, game 1 (the most valuable game), game 2 (the moderately valuable game), and game 3 (the least valuable game). The arrow shows the game transition based on players' behaviors and the current game, where p is the transition probability (A). If p = 1, the transition is deterministic: mutual cooperation always leads to the most valuable game to be played and mutual defection the least valuable game. The probabilistic transition can strengthen cooperation if the difference between benefits provided by an altruistic behavior in game 1 and 3 (∆b 13 
